It seems that rumors of the death of narratology have been greatly exaggerated. Recently we have witnessed a small but unmistakable explosion of activity in the field of narrative studies; signs of this minor narratological renaissance include the publication of a spate of articles, special issues, and books that rethink and recontextualize classical models for narratological research;' the evident success of the journal Narrative (not founded until 1993); and the establishment of a book series devoted specifically to "The Theory and Interpretation of Narrative" at the Ohio State University Press. Thus a full account of narratologya complete story of our ongoing rapprochement with storiesremains yet to be written. By the same token, narratology's history sometimes gets told in ways that flatten it out into a monolithically (if not monomaniacally) scientistic endeavor. Recounted too rapidly, the history of narratology can work to decontextualize a method of analysis that is itself sometimes charged with a lack of concern for context. In particular, it is important not to sever links between models for narrative analysis and surrounding critico-theoretical trends.
Here, in order to indicate ways in which classical narrative theory was embedded in its cultural milieux, I should like to reconsider one chapter in the history of structuralist narrative analysis as it emerged in France in the 1960s. My concern is with the genesis-and the genealogy-of the concept of narrative "actants." In the narratological tradition, actants represent a new, linguistically informed approach to the very old problem of lit-258 STCL, Volume 24, No.2 (Summer, 2000) erary character. Actants are typically defined as "fundamental role [s] at the level of narrative deep structure" (Prince 1 Like a drama, it [the sentence or "nceud verbal" 'verbal node'] comprises necessarily an action and most often actors and circumstances as well. Transposed from the plane of dramatic reality to that of structural syntax, the action, actors and circumstances become, respectively, the verb, the actants and the circumstants. The verb expresses the action. . . . The actants are beings or things that participate in the action-in whatever capacity and whatever style this might entail, even if it is as mere walk-ons and in the most passive way imaginable. Actants are always nouns or the equivalents of nouns. Inversely, in a given phrase nouns always assume, at least in principle, the function of actants. Synthesizing Propp's and Tesniere's ideas, Greimas reframed and radicalized one of the theoretical postulates informing Morphology of the Folktale: namely, the assumption that if characters are to be described in a systematic as opposed to an ad hoc way, they should be viewed not as clusters of qualities or traits, but rather as variables in a kind of behavioral calculus, or alternatively units in a grammar of action, a syntax of doing.' Adopting the Barthesian view that "a narrative is a long sentence, just as every constative sentence is ... the rough outline of a short narrative" ("Introduction" 84), Greimas drew on Tesniere's work to interpret actants as syntactic elements that are distributed in narrative "sentences" in patterned, predictable ways.' Thus, whereas actors are semantic units, actants are syntactic ones, such that "An actor functions as an actant only when it is put into play by either narrative syntax or linguistic syntax" (Greimas, "Actants" 114) . Further, actantial roles, like syntactic units, are theoretical constructs pertaining to all narratives; they are part of the very grammar of stories. By contrast, actors are the equivalent of particular sentences realized within the grammar of a language; the output of grammatical rules and operations located in the deep structure of narrative, actors are surface structures specific to particular stories (Greimas, In his "Introduction" Barthes remarks that, whereas in Aristotelian poetics "the notion of character is secondary, entirely subsidiary to the notion of action":
Later the character, who until then had been only a name, the agent of an action, acquired a psychological consistency, became an individual, a "person," in short a fully constituted "being," even should he do nothing and of course even before acting. Characters stopped being subordinate to the action, embodied immediately psychological essences; which essences could be drawn up into lists, as can be seen in its purest form in the list of "character parts" in bourgeois theatre. . . . From its very outset, structural analysis has shown the utmost reluctance to treat character as an essence, even merely for purposes of classification. . . . Structural analysis, much concerned not to define characters in terms of psychological essences, has so far 6 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2000] ... Thus . .. the essence of man precedes the historical existence that we find in nature" (35) . By contrast, in the atheistic existentialism championed by Sartre, there is at least one being in whom existence precedes essence, a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept, and ... this being is man, or, as Heidegger says, human reality. What is meant here by saying that existence precedes essence? It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself. If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterwards will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. )" For Sartre, the slogan "existence precedes essence" adumbrates important ethical as well as metaphysical propositions. It suggests that "there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human nature"; and because "there is no deter-minism, man is free, man is freedom." Thus humanity, "with no support and no aid, is condemned every moment to invent [humanity]" (Sartre 41) . In response to critics who charge the philosophy with exempting people from responsibility for their actions, the existentialist says: "There is no reality except in action." Even more tellingly, Sartre paraphrases existentialist doctrine as follows:
Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfills himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life.. .. What we mean is that a man is nothing else than a series of undertakings, that he is the sum, the organization, the ensemble of the relationships which make up these undertakings. (47; 48) Mutatis mutandis-with the philosopher focusing on human selves, the narratologist on narrative identities-Sartre and Barthes offer strikingly similar accounts. Both writers define identity as an ensemble of actions; both suggest that no psychological or moral essence precedes the acts (and choices to act) that make one become what one is. Indeed, the distinctly Sartrean overtones of Barthes's "Introduction" suggest the existential roots of narrative actants. Read against Sartrean philosophy, Barthes's account helps contextualize the two-stage process by which the structuralists combined Propp's and Tesniere's 8 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2000] The existentialist bases of narrative actants may compel us to rethink the future as well as the history of narratology. Historically, the existentialist influence might help account for the preeminence of certain kinds of grammatical models in the heyday of structuralist narratology. Rimmon-Kenan points to "methodological considerations" as the primary reason for the grafting of Propp's ideas onto Francophone structuralism, and in particular Propp's subordination of character to action:
Like any scientifically oriented discipline, formalist and structuralist poetics recognizes the methodological necessity of reduction, especially in preliminary phases of an inquiry. Since action seems more easily amenable to the construction of "narrative grammars" (often based on verb-centred grammars of natural languages), it is convenient to reduce character to action. (34) The more or less overt scientism of the structuralists, however, does not suffice to explain their reduction of character to action. The methodological imperative Rimmon-Kenan describes was itself part of a larger complex of cultural and intellectual forces. In the case of actantial models, the really interesting question is 266 STCL, Volume 24, No.2 (Summer, 2000) why certain methodologies borrowed from the field of linguistics-e.g., those associated with syntactic analysis -tool hold while others did not. In a different milieu, very different research hypotheses about actants might have suggested themselves. Indeed, a better understanding of narratology's past can help today's researchers envision new possibilities for narrative analysis. Whereas the structuralists for the most part drew on syntactic theory to develop their actantial typologies, more recent research has indicated the relevance of pragmatic and cognitive models for studying actants." Thus Monika Fludernik has outlined an enriched narratology according to which readers "naturalize" stories-bring them within the domain of the natural or comprehensible-in order to interpret them as narratives in the first place. In order to naturalize stories, readers typically use "frames" or pre-stored sets of expectations, and for Fludernik expectations about action or behavior constitute one of the most basic frames in terms of which people make sense out of narratives ." On this model, actants are not syntactic units built into narrative structure, but rather cognitive paradigms used to impute goal-directed behavior to narrative agents. After all, a story is not just an assemblage of discrete events; to be processed as a narrative, event-strings must also involve a specific configuration of participants or actants whose doings conform to known behavioral paradigms. Cognitively based inferences about actants thus allow story recipients to recognize certain modes of discourse as being narratively organized in the first place. More generally, though narrative actants may have had existentialist roots, and though those beginnings may have prompted narratologists to study characters in reductively syntactic terms at first, the concept of actants is in no way exhausted by the history of its uses.
Notes

